Recently we found two issues in the fuzzer tester: #9302#9285
After fixing them, more problems surfaced and this PR (as well as #9297) aims to fix them.
Here's a list of the fixes
- Prevent an overflow when allocating a dict hashtable
- Prevent OOM when attempting to allocate a huge string
- Prevent a few invalid accesses in listpack
- Improve sanitization of listpack first entry
- Validate integrity of stream consumer groups PEL
- Validate integrity of stream listpack entry IDs
- Validate ziplist tail followed by extra data which start with 0xff
Co-authored-by: sundb <sundbcn@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0c90370e6d71cc68e4d9cc79a0d8b1e768712a5b)
Fix that there is no sample latency after the key expires via expireIfNeeded().
Some refactoring for shared code.
(cherry picked from commit ca559819f7dcd97ba9ef667bf38360a9527d62f6)
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
GETBIT, SETBIT may access wrong address because of wrap.
BITCOUNT and BITPOS may return wrapped results.
BITFIELD may access the wrong address but also allocate insufficient memory and segfault (see CVE-2021-32761).
This commit uses `uint64_t` or `long long` instead of `size_t`.
related https://github.com/redis/redis/pull/8096
At 32bit platform:
> setbit bit 4294967295 1
(integer) 0
> config set proto-max-bulk-len 536870913
OK
> append bit "\xFF"
(integer) 536870913
> getbit bit 4294967296
(integer) 0
When the bit index is larger than 4294967295, size_t can't hold bit index. In the past, `proto-max-bulk-len` is limit to 536870912, so there is no problem.
After this commit, bit position is stored in `uint64_t` or `long long`. So when `proto-max-bulk-len > 536870912`, 32bit platforms can still be correct.
For 64bit platform, this problem still exists. The major reason is bit pos 8 times of byte pos. When proto-max-bulk-len is very larger, bit pos may overflow.
But at 64bit platform, we don't have so long string. So this bug may never happen.
Additionally this commit add a test cost `512MB` memory which is tag as `large-memory`. Make freebsd ci and valgrind ci ignore this test.
(cherry picked from commit 71d452876ebf8456afaadd6b3c27988abadd1148)
