- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
This change sets a low limit for multibulk and bulk length in the
protocol for unauthenticated connections, so that they can't easily
cause redis to allocate massive amounts of memory by sending just a few
characters on the network.
The new limits are 10 arguments of 16kb each (instead of 1m of 512mb)
GETBIT, SETBIT may access wrong address because of wrap.
BITCOUNT and BITPOS may return wrapped results.
BITFIELD may access the wrong address but also allocate insufficient memory and segfault (see CVE-2021-32761).
This commit uses `uint64_t` or `long long` instead of `size_t`.
related https://github.com/redis/redis/pull/8096
At 32bit platform:
> setbit bit 4294967295 1
(integer) 0
> config set proto-max-bulk-len 536870913
OK
> append bit "\xFF"
(integer) 536870913
> getbit bit 4294967296
(integer) 0
When the bit index is larger than 4294967295, size_t can't hold bit index. In the past, `proto-max-bulk-len` is limit to 536870912, so there is no problem.
After this commit, bit position is stored in `uint64_t` or `long long`. So when `proto-max-bulk-len > 536870912`, 32bit platforms can still be correct.
For 64bit platform, this problem still exists. The major reason is bit pos 8 times of byte pos. When proto-max-bulk-len is very larger, bit pos may overflow.
But at 64bit platform, we don't have so long string. So this bug may never happen.
Additionally this commit add a test cost `512MB` memory which is tag as `large-memory`. Make freebsd ci and valgrind ci ignore this test.
(cherry picked from commit 71d452876ebf8456afaadd6b3c27988abadd1148)
Modules that use background threads with thread safe contexts are likely
to use RM_BlockClient() without a timeout function, because they do not
set up a timeout.
Before this commit, `CLIENT UNBLOCK` would result with a crash as the
`NULL` timeout callback is called. Beyond just crashing, this is also
logically wrong as it may throw the module into an unexpected client
state.
This commits makes `CLIENT UNBLOCK` on such clients behave the same as
any other client that is not in a blocked state and therefore cannot be
unblocked.
(cherry picked from commit aa139e2f02292d668370afde8c91575363c2d611)
- promote the code in DEBUG PROTOCOL to addReplyBigNum
- DEBUG PROTOCOL ATTRIB skips the attribute when client is RESP2
- networking.c addReply for push and attributes generate assertion when
called on a RESP2 client, anything else would produce a broken
protocol that clients can't handle.
(cherry picked from commit 6a5bac309e868deef749c36949723b415de2496f)
There are two issues fixed in this commit:
1. we want to fail the EXEC command in case there is a watched key that's logically
expired but not yet deleted by active expire or lazy expire.
2. we saw that currently cache time is update in every `call()` (including nested calls),
this time is being also being use for the isKeyExpired comparison, we want to update
the cache time only in the first call (execCommand)
Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
(cherry picked from commit ac8b1df8850cc80fbf9ce8c2fbde0c1d3a1b4e91)
