Technically declaring a prototype with an empty declaration has been deprecated since the early days of C, but we never got a warning for it. C2x will apparently be introducing a breaking change if you are using this type of declarator, so Clang 15 has started issuing a warning with -pedantic. Although not apparently a problem for any of the compiler we build on, if feels like the right thing is to properly adhere to the C standard and use (void).
Build fails with warnings in ARM CI after adding more aggressive optimizations (#11350)
probably a result of more aggressive inlining
```
ziplist.c: In function ‘pop.constprop’:
ziplist.c:1770:13: error: ‘vlong’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
printf("%lld", vlong);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
```
```
listpack.c: In function ‘lpInsert.constprop’:
listpack.c:406:9: error: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-Werror=nonnull]
memcpy(buf+1,s,len);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
```
replace use of:
sprintf --> snprintf
strcpy/strncpy --> redis_strlcpy
strcat/strncat --> redis_strlcat
**why are we making this change?**
Much of the code uses some unsafe variants or deprecated buffer handling
functions.
While most cases are probably not presenting any issue on the known path
programming errors and unterminated strings might lead to potential
buffer overflows which are not covered by tests.
**As part of this PR we change**
1. added implementation for redis_strlcpy and redis_strlcat based on the strl implementation: https://linux.die.net/man/3/strl
2. change all occurrences of use of sprintf with use of snprintf
3. change occurrences of use of strcpy/strncpy with redis_strlcpy
4. change occurrences of use of strcat/strncat with redis_strlcat
5. change the behavior of ll2string/ull2string/ld2string so that it will always place null
termination ('\0') on the output buffer in the first index. this was done in order to make
the use of these functions more safe in cases were the user will not check the output
returned by them (for example in rdbRemoveTempFile)
6. we added a compiler directive to issue a deprecation error in case a use of
sprintf/strcpy/strcat is found during compilation which will result in error during compile time.
However keep in mind that since the deprecation attribute is not supported on all compilers,
this is expected to fail during push workflows.
**NOTE:** while this is only an initial milestone. We might also consider
using the *_s implementation provided by the C11 Extensions (however not
yet widly supported). I would also suggest to start
looking at static code analyzers to track unsafe use cases.
For example LLVM clang checker supports security.insecureAPI.DeprecatedOrUnsafeBufferHandling
which can help locate unsafe function usage.
https://clang.llvm.org/docs/analyzer/checkers.html#security-insecureapi-deprecatedorunsafebufferhandling-c
The main reason not to onboard it at this stage is that the alternative
excepted by clang is to use the C11 extensions which are not always
supported by stdlib.
- Added sanitizer support. `address`, `undefined` and `thread` sanitizers are available.
- To build Redis with desired sanitizer : `make SANITIZER=undefined`
- There were some sanitizer findings, cleaned up codebase
- Added tests with address and undefined behavior sanitizers to daily CI.
- Added tests with address sanitizer to the per-PR CI (smoke out mem leaks sooner).
Basically, there are three types of issues :
**1- Unaligned load/store** : Most probably, this issue may cause a crash on a platform that
does not support unaligned access. Redis does unaligned access only on supported platforms.
**2- Signed integer overflow.** Although, signed overflow issue can be problematic time to time
and change how compiler generates code, current findings mostly about signed shift or simple
addition overflow. For most platforms Redis can be compiled for, this wouldn't cause any issue
as far as I can tell (checked generated code on godbolt.org).
**3 -Minor leak** (redis-cli), **use-after-free**(just before calling exit());
UB means nothing guaranteed and risky to reason about program behavior but I don't think any
of the fixes here worth backporting. As sanitizers are now part of the CI, preventing new issues
will be the real benefit.
- fix possible heap corruption in ziplist and listpack resulting by trying to
allocate more than the maximum size of 4GB.
- prevent ziplist (hash and zset) from reaching size of above 1GB, will be
converted to HT encoding, that's not a useful size.
- prevent listpack (stream) from reaching size of above 1GB.
- XADD will start a new listpack if the new record may cause the previous
listpack to grow over 1GB.
- XADD will respond with an error if a single stream record is over 1GB
- List type (ziplist in quicklist) was truncating strings that were over 4GB,
now it'll respond with an error.
Co-authored-by: sundb <sundbcn@gmail.com>
Part two of implementing #8702 (zset), after #8887.
## Description of the feature
Replaced all uses of ziplist with listpack in t_zset, and optimized some of the code to optimize performance.
## Rdb format changes
New `RDB_TYPE_ZSET_LISTPACK` rdb type.
## Rdb loading improvements:
1) Pre-expansion of dict for validation of duplicate data for listpack and ziplist.
2) Simplifying the release of empty key objects when RDB loading.
3) Unify ziplist and listpack data verify methods for zset and hash, and move code to rdb.c.
## Interface changes
1) New `zset-max-listpack-entries` config is an alias for `zset-max-ziplist-entries` (same with `zset-max-listpack-value`).
2) OBJECT ENCODING will return listpack instead of ziplist.
## Listpack improvements:
1) Add `lpDeleteRange` and `lpDeleteRangeWithEntry` functions to delete a range of entries from listpack.
2) Improve the performance of `lpCompare`, converting from string to integer is faster than converting from integer to string.
3) Replace `snprintf` with `ll2string` to improve performance in converting numbers to strings in `lpGet()`.
## Zset improvements:
1) Improve the performance of `zzlFind` method, use `lpFind` instead of `lpCompare` in a loop.
2) Use `lpDeleteRangeWithEntry` instead of `lpDelete` twice to delete a element of zset.
## Tests
1) Add some unittests for `lpDeleteRange` and `lpDeleteRangeWithEntry` function.
2) Add zset RDB loading test.
3) Add benchmark test for `lpCompare` and `ziplsitCompare`.
4) Add empty listpack zset corrupt dump test.
This commit mainly fixes empty keys due to RDB loading and restore command,
which was omitted in #9297.
1) When loading quicklsit, if all the ziplists in the quicklist are empty, NULL will be returned.
If only some of the ziplists are empty, then we will skip the empty ziplists silently.
2) When loading hash zipmap, if zipmap is empty, sanitization check will fail.
3) When loading hash ziplist, if ziplist is empty, NULL will be returned.
4) Add RDB loading test with sanitize.
Recently we found two issues in the fuzzer tester: #9302#9285
After fixing them, more problems surfaced and this PR (as well as #9297) aims to fix them.
Here's a list of the fixes
- Prevent an overflow when allocating a dict hashtable
- Prevent OOM when attempting to allocate a huge string
- Prevent a few invalid accesses in listpack
- Improve sanitization of listpack first entry
- Validate integrity of stream consumer groups PEL
- Validate integrity of stream listpack entry IDs
- Validate ziplist tail followed by extra data which start with 0xff
Co-authored-by: sundb <sundbcn@gmail.com>
The if judgement `nextdiff == -4 && reqlen < 4` in __ziplistInsert.
It's strange, but it's useful. Without it there will be problems during
chain update.
Till now these lines didn't have coverage in the tests, and there was
a question if they are at all needed (#7170)
This PR adds a spell checker CI action that will fail future PRs if they introduce typos and spelling mistakes.
This spell checker is based on blacklist of common spelling mistakes, so it will not catch everything,
but at least it is also unlikely to cause false positives.
Besides that, the PR also fixes many spelling mistakes and types, not all are a result of the spell checker we use.
Here's a summary of other changes:
1. Scanned the entire source code and fixes all sorts of typos and spelling mistakes (including missing or extra spaces).
2. Outdated function / variable / argument names in comments
3. Fix outdated keyspace masks error log when we check `config.notify-keyspace-events` in loadServerConfigFromString.
4. Trim the white space at the end of line in `module.c`. Check: https://github.com/redis/redis/pull/7751
5. Some outdated https link URLs.
6. Fix some outdated comment. Such as:
- In README: about the rdb, we used to said create a `thread`, change to `process`
- dbRandomKey function coment (about the dictGetRandomKey, change to dictGetFairRandomKey)
- notifyKeyspaceEvent fucntion comment (add type arg)
- Some others minor fix in comment (Most of them are incorrectly quoted by variable names)
7. Modified the error log so that users can easily distinguish between TCP and TLS in `changeBindAddr`
After sorting, each item in picks is sorted according
to its index.
In the original code logic, we traverse from the first
element of ziplist until `zipindex == picks[pickindex].index`.
We may be able to start directly in `picks[0].index`,
this will bring small performance improvement.
Signed-off-by: ZheNing Hu <adlternative@gmail.com>
1. Add `redis-server test all` support to run all tests.
2. Add redis test to daily ci.
3. Add `--accurate` option to run slow tests for more iterations (so that
by default we run less cycles (shorter time, and less prints).
4. Move dict benchmark to REDIS_TEST.
5. fix some leaks in tests
6. make quicklist tests run on a specific fill set of options rather than huge ranges
7. move some prints in quicklist test outside their loops to reduce prints
8. removing sds.h from dict.c since it is now used in both redis-server and
redis-cli (uses hiredis sds)
Avoids memmove and reallocs when replacing a ziplist element of the
same encoded size as the new value.
Affects HSET, HINRBY, HINCRBYFLOAT (via hashTypeSet) and LSET (via
quicklistReplaceAtIndex).
When (remaining == (total_size - index)), element will definitely be random to.
But when rand() == RAND_MAX, the element will miss, this will trigger assert
in serverAssert(ziplistRandomPairsUnique(zsetobj->ptr, count, keys, vals) == count).
It is inefficient to repeatedly pick a single random element from a
ziplist.
For CASE4, which is when the user requested a low number of unique
random picks from the collectoin, we used thta pattern.
Now we use a different algorithm that picks unique elements from a
ziplist, and guarentee no duplicate but doesn't provide random order
(which is only needed in the non-unique random picks case)
Unrelated changes:
* change ziplist count and indexes variables to unsigned
* solve compilation warnings about uninitialized vars in gcc 10.2
Co-authored-by: xinluton <xinluton@qq.com>
Changes to HRANDFIELD and ZRANDMEMBER:
* Fix risk of OOM panic when client query a very big negative count (avoid allocating huge temporary buffer).
* Fix uneven random distribution in HRANDFIELD with negative count (wasn't using dictGetFairRandomKey).
* Add tests to check an even random distribution (HRANDFIELD, SRANDMEMBER, ZRANDMEMBER).
Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
* The corrupt dump fuzzer found a division by zero.
* in some cases the random fields from the HRANDFIELD tests produced
fields with newlines and other special chars (due to \ char), this caused
the TCL tests to see a bulk response that has a newline in it and add {}
around it, later it can think this is a nested list. in fact the `alpha` random
string generator isn't using spaces and newlines, so it should not use `\`
either.
New commands:
`HRANDFIELD [<count> [WITHVALUES]]`
`ZRANDMEMBER [<count> [WITHSCORES]]`
Algorithms are similar to the one in SRANDMEMBER.
Both return a simple bulk response when no arguments are given, and an array otherwise.
In case values/scores are requested, RESP2 returns a long array, and RESP3 a nested array.
note: in all 3 commands, the only option that also provides random order is the one with negative count.
Changes to SRANDMEMBER
* Optimization when count is 1, we can use the more efficient algorithm of non-unique random
* optimization: work with sds strings rather than robj
Other changes:
* zzlGetScore: when zset needs to convert string to double, we use safer memcpy (in
case the buffer is too small)
* Solve a "bug" in SRANDMEMBER test: it intended to test a positive count (case 3 or
case 4) and by accident used a negative count
Co-authored-by: xinluton <xinluton@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
First, if the ziplist header is surely inside the ziplist, do fast path
decoding rather than the careful one.
In that case, streamline the encoding if-else chain to be executed only
once, and the encoding validity tested at the end.
encourage inlining
likely / unlikely hints for speculative execution
Assertion used _exit(1) to tell the compiler that the code after them is
not reachable and get rid of warnings.
But in some cases assertions are placed inside tight loops, and any
piece of code in them can slow down execution (code cache and other
reasons), instead using either abort() or better yet, unreachable
builtin.
If RESTORE passes successfully with full sanitization, we can't affort
to crash later on assertion due to duplicate records in a hash when
converting it form ziplist to dict.
This means that when doing full sanitization, we must make sure there
are no duplicate records in any of the collections.
When loading an encoded payload we will at least do a shallow validation to
check that the size that's encoded in the payload matches the size of the
allocation.
This let's us later use this encoded size to make sure the various offsets
inside encoded payload don't reach outside the allocation, if they do, we'll
assert/panic, but at least we won't segfault or smear memory.
We can also do 'deep' validation which runs on all the records of the encoded
payload and validates that they don't contain invalid offsets. This lets us
detect corruptions early and reject a RESTORE command rather than accepting
it and asserting (crashing) later when accessing that payload via some command.
configuration:
- adding ACL flag skip-sanitize-payload
- adding config sanitize-dump-payload [yes/no/clients]
For now, we don't have a good way to ensure MIGRATE in cluster resharding isn't
being slowed down by these sanitation, so i'm setting the default value to `no`,
but later on it should be set to `clients` by default.
changes:
- changing rdbReportError not to `exit` in RESTORE command
- adding a new stat to be able to later check if cluster MIGRATE isn't being
slowed down by sanitation.
The previous algorithm is of O(n^2) time complexity.
It would have run through the ziplist entries one by one, each time doing a `realloc` and a
`memmove` (moving the entire tail of the ziplist).
The new algorithm is O(n), it runs over all the records once, computing the size of the `realloc`
needed, then does one `realloc`, and run thought the records again doing many smaller `memmove`s,
each time moving just one record.
So this change reduces many reallocs, and moves each record just once.
Co-authored-by: zhumaohua <zhumaohua@megvii.com>
Co-authored-by: Oran Agra <oran@redislabs.com>
* fix description about ZIP_BIG_PREVLEN(the code is ok), it's similar to
antirez#4705
* fix description about ziplist entry encoding field (the code is ok),
the max length should be 2^32 - 1 when encoding is 5 bytes
Hi, @antirez
In the code, to get the size of ziplist, "unsigned int bytes = ZIPLIST_HEADER_SIZE+1;" is correct,
but why not make it more readable and easy to understand
Ziplists had a bug that was discovered while investigating a different
issue, resulting in a corrupted ziplist representation, and a likely
segmentation foult and/or data corruption of the last element of the
ziplist, once the ziplist is accessed again.
The bug happens when a specific set of insertions / deletions is
performed so that an entry is encoded to have a "prevlen" field (the
length of the previous entry) of 5 bytes but with a count that could be
encoded in a "prevlen" field of a since byte. This could happen when the
"cascading update" process called by ziplistInsert()/ziplistDelete() in
certain contitious forces the prevlen to be bigger than necessary in
order to avoid too much data moving around.
Once such an entry is generated, inserting a very small entry
immediately before it will result in a resizing of the ziplist for a
count smaller than the current ziplist length (which is a violation,
inserting code expects the ziplist to get bigger actually). So an FF
byte is inserted in a misplaced position. Moreover a realloc() is
performed with a count smaller than the ziplist current length so the
final bytes could be trashed as well.
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS:
Currently it looks like an attacker can only crash a Redis server by
providing specifically choosen commands. However a FF byte is written
and there are other memory operations that depend on a wrong count, so
even if it is not immediately apparent how to mount an attack in order
to execute code remotely, it is not impossible at all that this could be
done. Attacks always get better... and we did not spent enough time in
order to think how to exploit this issue, but security researchers
or malicious attackers could.
The commit improves ziplistRepr() and adds a new debugging subcommand so
that we can trigger the dump directly from the Redis API.
This command capability was used while investigating issue #3684.
